Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is a great

pleasure to be here. And I am appearing before you in response to

the invitation letter in two hats—one is NATO commander and one

is European commander—to talk a little bit about Africa and

NATO’s efforts in Africa with specific emphasis on Darfur. And I

will do that very briefly, because I think I can summarize it very

quickly. And also the United States European Command’s theater

security engagement in Africa.

And I have before you some charts, and I will just refer to them

just so you can follow along. The first one that you have before you

is the Unified Command Plan. And it shows you the expanse of the

U.S. European Command’s area of operation, which includes 91

countries in Europe, Africa, and the Near East.

In the European Command and in NATO, we feel that the African

reality is here for us and for those who are concerned about

the strategic future and its implications with regard to our collective

security in the 21st century. NATO’s initial attention to Africa

and the crisis in Sudan and its revitalized Mediterranean dialogue

are indications of a growing awareness of this new reality within

the alliance itself. How EUCOM’s theater security strategy helps to

bring stability to vast areas plagued by chronic instability is a developing

success story, which could be the prologue for our engagement

in the 21st century.

Let me turn very quickly to NATO and ask you to look at the

second chart that should be in your stack in front of you. at 26 nations,

NATO is today our most important and enduring strategic

alliance. It is changing dramatically and has changed over the last

three years. It has gone from being essentially a reactive, defensive,

static, linear alliance arrayed against an equally static threat

to a more proactive capability that is developing agility, speed, and

a geostrategic sense of its missions for the 21st century.

Today, NATO is involved in operations in Afghanistan, in Iraq,

from which I just returned this morning, in the Balkans, an operation-

active endeavor in the Mediterranean. We have bilateral relations

with Russia, the Ukraine, Partnership for Peace nations, the

Mediterranean dialogue nations, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

And NATO’s primary example for transformation is the development

of the NATO Response Force.

The third chart will talk briefly about NATO’s mission to Darfur.

The African mission in the Sudan known as AMIS is an example

of the alliance’s extended focus and willing reach. Secretary

Zoellick’s expose´ more than adequately captured the history and

the current issues of today’s problem. So I will just simply comment

on the three facets of the NATO mission.

This is a 15-nation contribution to coordinate airlift donation

with AU troop, African Union troop, deployment plans. Secondly, to

support the U.N. peacekeeping and planning and conducting of a

map exercise to help train the staff of the AMIS force headquarters

at El Fasher. And three, capacity building for the staff officers of

the AMIS.

The keys to our operation are that NATO is in support of the African

Union, that NATO works closely with African Union officials.

And so far one of my conclusions of this effort has been that this

underscores the ability of NATO to work with multiple organizations,

such as the U.N., the EU, the AU, and other organizations

simultaneously.

NATO is today considering additional requests from the African

Union, which it has received. The North Atlantic Council has probably

already discussed it, and I am just not aware of what they

have decided. But my guess is that they will prolong their mission.

It is obvious that the strategic importance of Africa is growing, and

we are not alone. We, the United States, are not alone in recognizing

this fact.

For example, China plays an increasingly active economic role in

Africa today with an increase of 48 percent in its economic aspirations

since 2002. To paraphrase a statement made to me by an African

leader about the growing China relationship in Africa. He

says: We love the United States. You, above all else, tell us exactly

what we need. And then China turns around and gives it to us.

The United States still remains number one in economic relations

in the totality of Africa with a $44 billion in 2005. However,

in Africa we have to be concerned about the inroads of Jihadism,

which is slow but steady. In my view, it is the number one common

concern loosely referred to as terrorism in large, generally

ungoverned areas, which spawn recruiting for such activities from

among the hopeless.

Shifting demographics and pandemic diseases are well-known.

The median age of Africa will soon be 15 years old, whereas in Europe

it will soon approach 50 years old. This disproportionate distribution

of wealth between the haves and the have-nots, corruption,

crime, piracy in potentially wealthy states, but immense opportunities

to bring stability and economic recovery through a

proactive engagement over a sustained period of time.

It is estimated that 25 percent of the United States oil imports

will come from the Gulf of Guinea within the next ten years. And

liquid natural gas from the region will reach $30 billion within a

10-year period.

Theater security corporation activities led by the European Command

is derived from our regional priority and policy guidance

from the Secretary of Defense’s security cooperation guidance. The

centerpiece of our efforts for security and stability lies in building

relationships with allies and regional partners. Theater security cooperation

is regionally focused across five regions of Africa. And

your next chart should show how the African Union itself looks at

Africa in terms of five distinct regions.

A few examples of theater security initiatives may be helpful.

The Global Peace Operations Initiative, known as GPOI, meets our

growing need for peacekeeping operations, enables us to work with

lead nations and international organizations. In Africa, US-GPOI

will expand existing Africa contingency operations, training and assistance programs to develop the African capacity for peacekeeping

operations and support.

Eighty million dollars in appropriations for GPOI was provided

in the 1005 omnibus appropriations bill. I would like to thank you,

Mr. Chairman, for your efforts on GPOI in getting funds to meet

our growing need for well-trained peacekeeping operation troops,

and thank the many members of the committee for their interest

in developing and recognizing the strategic importance of Africa.

Next I have two slides that may be of some interest to the committee

on the State Partnership Program, which is probably one of

the least understood, but most highly successful programs that the

United States has, not only in Africa but in Europe. And I have

taken the liberty of showing you the distribution of our National

Guard Partnership Programs in both Europe and Africa.

Of note, in 2003 there were no programs of that kind of Africa.

And you can see the progress we have made in a short period of

time. This, to me, is an irreplaceable effort on behalf of our state

National Guard air and ground forces to develop partnerships in

developing areas of the world that are based on mutual trust and

confidence and confidence sharing and capacity building. I can

think of no program that has more long-term significance and potential

than the State Partnership Program.

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, known as TSCTI,

is a long-term interagency effort to combat terrorism in the Trans-

Saharan Africa. Its goals is to assist governments to better understand

and control events in their borders, to deny safe haven for

terrorist practices, recruiting, and training, and to help fragile democracies

who need our proactive help to be successful in combating

serious challenges within their borders, challenges such as

security, social problems, economic problems, offsetting the

Jihadism recruiting, corruption, and crime, and a myriad of other

difficulties that plague many nations in Africa.

Another approach is a clearinghouse approach. Clearinghouses

created for Africa, the South Caucuses in southeastern Europe, allowing

the U.S. to coordinate our actions with those of other nations

involved in similar efforts in the same regions. This has the

effect of eliminating redundancy. It saves money. It allows for more

cohesive international efforts. And it deconflicts many international

programs.

Africa Clearinghouse has brought 13 African countries together

with NATO, the EU, and the United Nations. An inaugural conference

was held in May 2004, focused on West Africa and the Economic

Community of West African States, known as ECOWAS.

And in December of that year, a similar conference was held, which

focused on the Eastern African states. So the clearinghouse concept

is very, very efficient and very important for the future of our combined

international activities in Africa.

Finally, a word about our security assistance programs. Foreign

Military Financing, or FMF, is the means for those who can afford

it to obtain U.S. equipment. The FMF request for 2006 is at $38.5

million.

Secondly, the International Military Education and Training,

known as IMET, provides education and training for foreign military and civilian personnel. Today’s IMET recipients are tomorrow’s

foreign military and civilian leaders. The EUCOM portion for

Africa of the IMET request for 2006 is $12.9 million.

One of the regular comments that one hears in Africa with regard

to the United States is that we are increasingly seen by many

as being difficult to work with, slow, and cumbersome in our responses.

And when we do respond, there are too many strings attached

and too many conditions to the assistance that we provide.

It is increasingly clear to me that our client states, especially in

Africa, have other options that they can turn to, and they are capitalizing

on them. Nonetheless, most would prefer a U.S. relationship.

Usually on security issues, the first telephone call they make

is to the United States for assistance.

In conclusion, it is a privilege to represent our proud nation as

a supreme allied commander of Europe and commander of the U.S.

European Command. The tasks we face in Africa are enormous but

are not insurmountable. The indispensable influence attained by

our forward presence coupled with our theater security cooperation

programs provides the best chance of prevailing in the global war

on terrorism and in meeting our national security goals.

As we work together to improve our capabilities and to advance

U.S. policy objectives, we must also recognize that today’s complex

security environment requires a greater degree of coordination

within our own government and among our allies in order to be effective.

As we support the African Union’s effort in Darfur, NATO

is determined to work in full transparency with the European

Union, the United Nations, NGOs, and individual nations.

Although very limited in scope and duration, the NATO response

to the crisis in Darfur is consistent with the transformation of the

alliance in response to the new security environment. NATO and

the United States, through the European Command, are engaged

in the most fundamental transformation and contemporary history.

it is an exciting time to be in Europe and to be Africa.

And Mr. Chairman, I look forward to responding to any questions

you might have. Thank you for your attention.

Mr. Chairman, the evolution was not a rapid

one, as you know. NATO, as a result of the Prague Summit in

2002, began its most fundamental transformation in terms of its

capabilities. And as I mentioned, it finds itself now in different

parts of the world, a far cry from the static defense philosophy of

the 20th century.

I believe that NATO’s interest in Africa is still quite embryonic.

But nonetheless, it is moving in the right direction. There is an Article

5 mission in the Mediterranean entitled Operation Active Endeavor.

It is NATO’s only counterterrorism operation. But it spans

the entire length of the Mediterranean.

NATO recently revised its Mediterranean dialogue with seven

Mediterranean countries as partners, five of which are on the

southern rim of the Mediterranean, and is attracting that kind of

interest in the security of this very important body of this very important

sea.

Despite the many political difficulties that some countries have

in the region, particularly the North Africa, the one thing they

have in common is a deep and abiding respect for the prospects of

terrorism occurring in their own backyards and not knowing anything

about it. Similarly, the divide between North Africa and the

Mediterranean is no longer a wide expanse. In literal terms, it is

a little bit like stepping over a stream.

And European countries and the alliance are properly concerned

about mass immigration, unlawful immigration, the spread of terrorism,

weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, and

Jihadism coming from the south to the north. And so I think NATO

is coming to the realization that a little proactive engagement could

probably go a long way, instead of being reactive and waiting for

something extraordinarily bad to happen and then having to spend

millions, if not billions, of Euros to counter whatever happens down

the road.

NATO is also planning on having its final exercise certifying the

NATO response force next year in Cape Verde islands, which is a

considerable strategic distance, but it is in a southern direction.

NATO has always been an east-west orientation. And it is exciting

for me, at least on a strategic sense, to see that kind of attention.

And the same holds true in the Middle East. The Secretary General

and NATO have sent emissaries to all countries in the Persian

Gulf to discuss how NATO might be of assistance in some way.

Some of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, notably Israel and

Jordan, of course, are very close to the theater. So these are dialogues

that are going on. And it is a characteristic of an expanding

scope of NATO’s strategic focus. And I think it is encouraging.

Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, a military officer

in uniform ventures into the political world at great risk. But

there is some clear signs of what is going on. I think it is more fact,

not conjecture. But a country like China, for example, is not encumbered

with some of the laws and regulations, quite appropriately,

that we have. And they are actively working in Africa.

And I might add that they are also doing the same thing in our

own hemisphere, in South America. But that is for somebody else

to talk about. But that is fairly well recognized.

But they are actively—they are busy in Africa on a very wide

plane, to include scholarships for young Africans to come to China

to study, all expenses paid, to bring African officers to China to

study Chinese tactics and Chinese weaponry, and then return to

their countries. And they are making these offers on a broad scale

at a very reduced rate, very affordable rate, many times absolutely

free.

And the economic bargaining that goes in is at rates that are

very, very attractive and without any strings attached. So this is,

I think this is something that the United States, and certainly

other nations, have to look at. And I was pleased to hear that there

was going to be a conference with China on that issue. And I think

it is important that—that is not to say that China cannot compete

in Africa, but we all, as much as possible, ought to be playing by

the same rules. And right now there is wide, it seems to me, to be

wide disparity in how we are playing.

I think the answer to that is it is still very embryonic

and very nationally focused in terms of individual domestic

economic issues and where they are engaged. And on Africa, as you

know, it is very sensitive in view of the history of many European

countries in the continent. But it—I think the good news is that

there are elements of change here. And I think that particularly

with the world of the U.S. European Command—and if I might, I

meant to introduce Major General Scott Gration, who is the J-5 at

the U.S. European Command. And the reason he is here, other

than the fact that he is a great U.S. Air Force officer, is that he

is the son of an African missionary. And he spent 17 years or 18

years of his life in Eastern Africa and speaks fluent Swahili.

And I cannot tell you what a difference it makes when I go to

Africa or when General Wall goes and we get off the airplane and

here is an Air Force general officer who speaks fluent Swahili and

was raised in Africa. So it gives us a real leg up on understanding

the issues, as only somebody who has lived there can explain them.

But I do believe that the focus of the Mediterranean dialogue,

the mission in Darfur, the NATO response force operation in Cape

Verde next year, and the operation Active Endeavor, all of these

are southern leanings that never existed in NATO just three years

ago.

The contribution of NATO nations, just from a

point of interest, included airlift donations from Denmark, Italy,

the Netherlands, Turkey, U.K., and the United States, and personnel

from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the

Netherlands, Spain, U.K., and the U.S. deployed on this mission,

go into Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and other parts in Africa.

The mission has been very carefully and very intentionally

scripted to provide support to the African Union. And therefore, it

is the African Union that NATO has asked to tell us what it is,

where we can be helpful. And what they have asked for are the

three elements that I described.

My feeling is that the African Union right now and the military

forces that we are dealing with are in fact about as far along as

they can be. We are talking about eight battalions, roughly, six of

which have been lifted into Darfur already. Two are not quite far

enough along to actually go there.

So the capacity of what the African Union can contribute in

terms of troops is limited somewhat by the experience factor. Although

they can get a lot of men, they just cannot get a lot of

trained men. And secondly, the ability to sustain those forces over

a period of time. And that is a big problem.

So if, in fact, the alliance wanted to do more, it would be in the

area, I think, of training, of providing capacity, of developing combat

service support, and the logistics for support of these battalions

that are operating at huge distances. I asked General Gration how

big Sudan was in relation to something in the United States. He

said from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico and from the East Coast

to the Mississippi. That is Sudan. Extraordinary distances.

And I am always relearning that lesson when I am thinking of

Africa, that you could take all of China, all of Russia, most of Europe,

put it in Africa and still have a lot of room. So an enormous

place. And that strategic distance makes it difficult.

So I would say, if NATO wished and if the EU wished, or other

nations, keep supporting the African Union. Stay with it. Teach

them the values of how militaries operate in a democracy. Make

sure that human rights is part of the whole thing. And do the nuts

and bolts work that has to be done to develop these competent

forces. I do not think there is an overnight solution.

Thank you, Senator. This is a complex issue, because

when you talk about training competent formations, military

formations, depending on where they come from from donor countries,

the distance factor, as I mentioned earlier, is a huge problem

because it involves how you sustain these forces once they are

there.

And a second challenge is how you rotate them, because they

cannot obviously stay forever. So you need a rotation base for the

force that goes in there. But given resources, of which the AU does

not have a lot of, but given resources and given training commitments

by competent nations who wish to do that kind of thing, capacity

building, training headquarters, and the like, you could increase

the capacity relatively quickly.

But it would take a dedicated commitment over a reasonably sustained

period of time and the resources to do that. The training aspect

of it is really not terribly difficult, but the totality of what

needs to be done is expensive and it will take time. But it can be

done.

I think you could do it. And I think the African

Union is the way to do it. I think in all of our activities, whether

it is NATO or the U.S. European Command in Africa, we always

try to make sure that there is African buy-in to what we are doing

and there is an African identification with what we are doing. So

that Africans must be involved in developing their own future. And

it must be, in my view, the—it is nonnegotiable that they are off

to the side while we are doing anything. They have to be fully involved

and have ownership. And that works extraordinarily well,

as you know.

Senator, I thank you for that question, because

that is something that we have been thinking quite about in the

European Command, because it is at the essence of, I think, success

and failure in the 21st Century. And the way I would answer

the question is to say that I personally believe that reactive costs

are always vastly more expensive than proactive costs. So I am an

advocate for proactive engagement.

The key is to be able to decide where and at what time and how

you engage. So whether it is the United States bilaterally or within

a coalition or as part of NATO, I think the principle is the same.

For example, in Africa, using the proactive versus reactive analogy,

in 2004, we expended $2.9 billion or 96 percent of our total Africa

security costs in a reactive way, whereas a proactive engagement

was only $120 million.

And what I am trying to suggest here is that if we are able, and

as we are doing, by the way, in North African and sub-Saharan African

where there is a common coming together among nations

about the concerns of security of their vastly undermanned spaces

and their borders, which have shown the beginnings of Jihadism

activities and recruiting, terrorism, if you will, we are engaging for

a very small amount of money with U.S. forces and forces of other

countries to help various nations train their forces in support of a

democracy.

But the difference is we are not waiting for something bad to

happen. We are doing it with them, pushing them to the front, encouraging

them to work with their neighbors on this common problem.

And it has been astounding to see the progress in a short period

of time. It is not page one of the Washington Post, but it will

help prevent a page one for the Washington Post in 10 years’ time

or 15 years’ time. And I believe that this proactive engagement is

really the key.

I would be glad to.